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Abstract
We analyze an environment with asymmetric information where a country tries to attract a
multi−national corporation. The country can use both taxes and grants to meet its objective of
maximizing net revenues. We show that when the country has private information it can
often convey it via its choice of a tax−grant pair. When the tax rates are unbounded the
country is able to extract the full surplus. The existence of an upper bound can in some cases
reduce the payoff to a stronger country.
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1 Introduction
Governments at local and national levels are vigorously pursuing large corpo-
rations for the purpose of having them set up headquarters or plants in their
respective jurisdictions: In 1995 Intel received a grant of $608 million (spread
over several years) to build a $1.6 billion plant in southern Israel. The Toyota
corporation secured a grant of $125 million from the State of Kentucky in
return for locating an $800 million plant employing 3000 workers.
Success in attracting these ventures is likely to generate employment
gains, increased tax revenues and possible stimulation of local production
through beneficial spillover eﬀects. The magnitude of these factors depends
on the characteristics of the corporations relocating into the region in ques-
tion.
A major diﬃculty in attracting suitable corporations stems from asym-
metries of information between the possible incoming corporations and the
diﬀerent regions. Bond and Samuelson [1986] focus on the role played by pri-
vate information on part of the countries and study conditions under which
diﬀerent countries oﬀer diﬀerent tax schedules resulting in tax holidays that
in eﬀect reveal their private information.
Other scenarios of competition to attract firms have been studied: Black
and Hoyt [1989] focus on tax burden considerations. King, McAfee and
Welling [1993] analyze an uncertain environment with sunk costs. Haaprante
[1996] considers environments where firms decided upon the percentage of
firm activity to be carried out in each location and countries use a menu
auction to attract firms (see Bernheim and Whinston [1986]).
We analyze an environment similar to the Bond and Samuelson [1986]
model. The country is assumed to have private information on its produc-
tivity. We analyze the impact of introducing grants in addition to the taxes
studied by Bond and Samuelson as a policy tool to attract multi-national
corporations. The country’s objective is to maximize tax revenues net of any
grants and the firm’s objective is profit maximization. We analyze the re-
sulting game and show that in the presence of grants, tax holidays disappear.
We also show that grants generate the appropriate payoﬀs to coincide with
the firm’s reservation value.
Finally, we consider the case where the tax rates used are bounded from
above due to either political or incentive considerations. We analyze the
resulting equilibria and reach conclusions similar to those without tax rate
restrictions.
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2 A privately informed country
We build upon the Bond and Samuelson [1986] model by adding the policy
tool of grants in addition to ad valorem taxes. This environment consists of
one firm and two countries (home and foreign) and extends over two periods.
The firm chooses to locate its plant in either of the two countries. If the
firm chooses to locate in the foreign country, it incurs a fixed cost K. If
the firm stays in the home country for both periods, it will earn profits of
V1 — its reservation value. If the firm chooses the foreign country in period
1 it can relocate back to the home country in period 2 and earn profits of
V2 for period 2. The firm’s profits in the foreign country depend on the
productivity of the foreign country and the schedule of taxes and grants
oﬀered. The foreign country’s productivity (type) is either H (high) with
probability p or L (low) with probability (1− p), and is privately known to
the foreign country. Before-tax, per-period profits are RH in an H country
and RL in an L country. At the beginning of period 2, a firm that chose
the foreign country learns the country’s type and may relocate back to the
home country. Both country and firm discount second period income by a
factor of δ. We say it is eﬃcient for a firm to enter a country of type i if
Ri −K + δ ·Max{Ri, V2} ≥ V1.
We assume the foreign country can commit to a given schedule of taxes
and grants for only one period. Hence, being a net revenue maximizer, it will
extract all the surplus in the second period, leaving the firm at its reservation
value V2.
2.1 Equilibria
An equilibrium consists of the strategies adopted by each type of foreign
country, the beliefs held by the firm, and the firm’s strategy. Potential equi-
libria are either separating or pooling.
Bond and Samuelson found that there exist separating equilibria where
tax holidays (lower first period tax rates) are used as a signal by a country
to indicate that it is an H country. Let us now examine our model to see if
this result holds when we introduce the possibility of grants.
In a separating equilibrium an H country oﬀers a tax rate tH and a grant
GH , while an L country oﬀers tL and GL with (tH , GH) 9= (tL, GL). On the
equilibrium path of a separating equilibrium, the firm knows the country’s
productivity with certainty. Thus, we should examine what happens un-
der complete information. We begin by considering the case where under
complete information each country type would have a positive payoﬀ when
oﬀering the firm its reservation value and in equilibrium the firm chooses to
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enter each type of country. The payoﬀ for a country of type i that uses a
tax-grant policy of type j is given by the function: Uij = U(tj , Gj , Ri) =
tjRi −Gj +Max{δ(Ri − V2), 0} where i and j can be either H or L
The analysis of such an equilibrium proceeds through the following series
of lemmata.
Lemma 1 In a separating equilibrium when entry occurs for both types of
countries, an H country oﬀers both a higher tax rate and a higher grant,
tL ≤ tH and GL ≤ GH .
Proof. It must be that neither type of country could gain by imitating
the other type. Hence (since the firm enters in either case): Uii ≥ Uij for all
i and j. Thus, type L should not gain by using the strategy of type H:
tHRL −GH +Max{δ(RL − V2), 0} ≤ tLRL −GL +Max{δ(RL − V2), 0}
=⇒ tHRL −GH ≤ tLRL −GL
Similarly type H should not gain by using the strategy of type L:
tLRH −GL ≤ tHRH −GH
These two conditions imply that
tL(RH −RL) ≤ tH(RH −RL)⇒ tL ≤ tH (since RL < RH)
Since the first condition implies
(tH − tL)RL ≤ GH −GL
We have, GL ≤ GH .
The intuition for this lemma is the following. The revenue diﬀerence by
choosing a higher tax rate for an H country is greater than that for an L
country. Thus, a higher grant in an H country will give proper incentive for
each type of country to choose the appropriate policy. This is a similar result
to that of screening contracts.
Lemma 2 Whenever entry occurs, the firm’s payoﬀ in a separating equilib-
rium equals its reservation value.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that the firm enters an L country
and its payoﬀ exceeds its reservation value so that (1−tL)RL+GL+δV2−K >
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V1. Using this inequality, an L country’s equilibrium payoﬀ satisfies the
following inequality
ULL = tLRL −GL +Max{δ(RL − V2), 0} < RL − V1 + δV2 −K +Max{δ(RL − V2), 0}
In such a case an L country could deviate and oﬀer tL = 1 and GL =
V1 +K − δV2 + ". Under this oﬀer the firm would enter the foreign country
since it would make profits of V1 +K + " (regardless of country type) which
exceed its reservation value. This leads to a contradiction since an L country’s
payoﬀ would be RL− (V1+K−δV2)+Max{δ(RL−V2), 0}−" which exceeds
its equilibrium payoﬀ for a small enough ". Similarly we can show that with
an H country the firm’s payoﬀ must coincide with its reservation value as
well.
Lemma 3 In a separating equilibrium when entry occurs for both types of
countries, the tax rate oﬀered by an H country equals 1.
Proof. By Lemma 2, if a firm enters for both types of countries, we have:
(1− tL)RL +GL + δV2 −K = V1
and
(1− tH)RH +GH + δV2 −K = V1
Combining we get:
(1− tL)RL +GL = (1− tH)RH +GH
In order for an L country to not have incentive to imitate an H country
(derived in the proof of Lemma 1), we have
tLRL −GL ≥ tHRL −GH
Adding we get:
RL ≥ RH + tH(RL −RH) = (1− tH)RH + tHRL
Therefore, tH = 1.
So far we have provided several conditions a separating equilibrium must
satisfy. We now proceed to show (by construction) that an equilibrium exists.
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Proposition 1 If it is eﬃcient for a firm to enter an L country, then a
separating equilibrium exists where the firm enters for both types of countries
and where: tH = 1 and GH = V1−δ ·V2+K and (tL, GL) satisfy (1−tL)RL+
GL = V1 − δ · V2 +K with tL < 1.
Proof. Since an H country pays a firm its reservation value it has no
incentive to deviate. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that a firm believes any
oﬀer that deviates comes from an L country. Hence, an L country also has no
incentive to deviate. These payoﬀs ensure that the firm earns its reservation
value for entering and countries have incentive to oﬀer these payments since
we assumed each country has a positive payoﬀ when oﬀering the reservation
value.
We now analyze the case of a pooling equilibrium. In a pooling equilib-
rium both types of countries oﬀer the same pair (t,G) and the firm believes
it faces an H country with probability p.
Lemma 4 In a pooling equilibrium, t = 1.
Proof. The equilibrium payoﬀ for anH country is: tRH−G+δ(RH−V2).
Assume by way of contradiction that t 9= 1, an H country can deviate to
t = 1 and G = G + (1 − t)[(1 − p)RL + pRH ]. The firm when faced with
such an oﬀer would enter since it gets the same as in the pooling equilibrium
regardless of the country’s type. An H country’s payoﬀ will then be:
RH −G− (1− t)[(1− p)RL + pRH ] + δ(RH − V2)
Since t, p < 1 and RH > RL, we have (1− t)RH > (1− t)[(1− p)RL + pRH ].
Rewriting gives us,
RH − (1− t)[(1− p)RL + pRH ] > tRH
and hence an H country’s payoﬀ is then
RH −G− (1− t)[(1− p)RL + pRH ] + δ(RH − V2) > tRH −G+ δ(RH − V2)
Thus, an H country has an incentive to deviate which is a contradiction;
hence, the tax rate in a pooling equilibrium must equal 1.
Since the tax rate is 1, the firm’s payoﬀ is independent of the country’s
type. The optimal action of the country is then to oﬀer the minimal grant
necessary to attract the firm which leads to the following result.
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Proposition 2 If it is eﬃcient for a firm to enter an L country, then a
pooling equilibrium exists and is given by t = 1 and G = V1 − δV2 +K for
both types of countries.
Proof. As before an H country cannot gain by deviating, therefore it is
reasonable to assume any deviation is by an L country. However, with such
beliefs an L country cannot gain by deviating either. Note that the firm
wants to enter independent of country type and eﬃciency for an L country
ensures that for both types of countries it would be worthwhile to oﬀer this
contract.
While for a given environment there may exist multiple equilibria, across
any of these equilibria the profits for either the firm or the country do not
vary. In contrast to the Bond and Samuelson analysis tax holidays are not
used as a signal, and furthermore signalling if done at all is with higher tax
rates.
2.2 A Maximum Tax Rate
Imposing high tax rates may not be viable due to a host of reasons. Hence
it is of interest to examine our findings in an environment where tax rates
cannot exceed a maximum denoted by tmax < 1. Such environments allow as
before both for separating and pooling equilibria, both of which are analyzed
in the following propositions.
Proposition 3 In a separating equilibrium when entry occurs for both types
of countries, tH = tmax
Proof. One can show in a similar method to Lemma 2 that in a sepa-
rating equilibrium an L country will extract all the surplus (since the firm
already thinks the country is of type L the country can just lower the grant
until no surplus is left). However, the same cannot be done for an H country.
Assume that the beliefs are such that with any deviation, the firm believes
the country is of type L. An H country can always deviate to the maximum
tax rate and give a grant G that would induce the firm to enter with the
beliefs that it is an L country.
(1− tmax)RL +G + δV2 −K = V1
The firm will actually receive
(1− tmax)RH +G + δV2 −K = V1 + (1− tmax)(RH −RL)
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The firm thus may have a surplus as high as (1−tmax)(RH−RL) when entering
an H country. Therefore, the payment a firm receives when entering an H
country is such that
(1− tH)RH +GH + δV2 −K ≤ V1 + (1− tmax)(RH −RL)
≤ (1− tL)RL +GL + δV2 −K + (1− tmax)(RH −RL)
As stated in the proof of Lemma 1, in order for an L country not to imitate
an H country we must have
tHRL −GH ≤ tLRL −GL
Combining these yields
(1− tH)RH + tHRL ≤ RL + (1− tmax)(RH −RL)
This simplifies to
0 ≤ (tmax − tH)(RL −RH)
Since RH ≥ RL, we have tH = tmax.
Proposition 4 In a separating equilibrium when entry occurs for both types
of countries, a firm entering an H country makes a strictly positive surplus.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the surplus is zero. Then, the
conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied leading to the conclusion that tH = 1.
Violating the restriction that tH ≤ tmax < 1.
We thus see that a maximum tax rate potentially lowers the amount of
surplus a high country can extract.
Proposition 5 In a pooling equilibrium the common tax rate coincides with
the maximum tax rate.
Proof. Let t and G be the oﬀer in the pooling equilibrium. Assume by
way of contradiction that t < tmax. In this case an H country can deviate to
an oﬀer of t + " and G that would be profitable for an H country and not
profitable for an L country (assuming entry still occurs). Thus we have
(t+ ")RH −G > tRH −G
(t+ ")RL −G < tRL −G
These are satisfied when
"RH +G > G > "RL +G
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(such a G exists since RH > RL). When presented with such an oﬀer, the
firm would then realize that the country is of type H and will enter if
(1− t− ")RH +G + δV2 −K ≥ V1
Since G > "RL +G, we have
(1− t− ")RH +G + δV2 −K ≥ (1− t)RH − "(RH −RL) +G+ δV2 −K
However, in the pooling equilibrium
(1− t)[(1− p)RL + pRH ] +G+ δV2 −K ≥ V1
Since RH > (1−p)RL+pRH , for small enough ", we have (1−t)RH−"(RH−
RL)+G+δV2−K ≥ V1. Thus, the firm still wants to enter and an H country
would gain from such a deviation.
Notice that even though the maximum tax rate is charged in a pooling
equilibrium, the firm would gain a surplus when the country is of type H (the
firm will not gain if the country is of type L) since on average the firm should
make its reservation value. Thus, a maximum tax rate will hurt profits of an
H country in a pooling equilibrium. If it is eﬃcient for a firm to enter an L
country, then as before both types of equilibria exist.
The intuition for our results is that it is more eﬀective for an H country to
signal via grants. An H country can raise the tax rate with an accompanying
change in the grant keeping its payoﬀ constant, while making it more costly
for an L country to imitate it.
3 Conclusions
We analyzed an environment where a country tries to attract a multi-national
corporation. The Bond and Samuelson [1986] model was augmented by al-
lowing the foreign country the choice of grants as well as taxes. We showed
that tax holidays disappear while grants are an important part of policy.
Environments where there is private information on both sides (the firm
and the country) remain to be thoroughly analyzed. It is also interesting
to see how changes in the bargaining power (which may result from the
introduction of more countries and firms) aﬀect the results. Furthermore, the
use of taxes and subsidies may also pose problems relating to the political
viability of these measures: there might be popular opposition to grants,
whereas industry lobbies might strongly object to high tax levels.
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